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ICS arbitrators would be paid by the day

THE CETA ICS arbitrators would be paid by the day: more and longer cases mean higher fees

The CETA arbitrators adjudicating on the merits of a claim for financial compensation by an investor at the ICS would be part-time employees who get paid more the longer a case goes on and the more cases that are taken. In order to retain their independence, the European Commission is proposing they are paid a ‘retainer’ fee of €24,000 a year, and then €3,000 to €7,000 a day when hearing cases:

“CETA provides for a combination of a monthly retainer fee determined by the CETA Joint Committee (the European Commission proposes €2,000 per month for members of the tribunal of first instance and €7,000 for members of the appeals tribunal) and per diems for days on which the tribunal members actually work on a case, on the basis of Regulation 14(1) of the Administrative and Financial Regulations of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, currently US$3,000 per day.” – Centre for International Governance Innovation (Krajewski, 2016).

See also, article 8.27.12 in CETA on ‘retainer’.

Reference:

Krajewski, M. (2016) ‘Half Court, Half Tribunal: Why the Proposed CETA Tribunal Should Be Transformed into a Permanent Court. Investor-State Arbitration Commentary Series No. 5. Series: Cosmic or Cosmetic Reform: Commentaries on the real and imagined potential of CETA’s investment tribunal’. May 12th . Available at: https://www.cigionline.org/publications/half-court-half-tribunal-why-proposed-ceta-tribunal-should-be-transformed-permanent  

And, from page 143: of: 

VanHarten, G. (2016) ‘The European Union’s Emerging  Approach  to  ISDS:  a  Review  of  the Canada-Europe  CETA,  Europe-Singapore  FTA,  and  European-Vietnam FTA’, in University Of Bologna Law Review, Vol. 1, ISSN2531-6133, DOI 10.6092/issn.2531-6133/6318. Available here: https://bolognalawreview.unibo.it/article/view/6318/6095 

Higher wages for arbitrators the more cases they take:

“Most  significantly,  in  the  revised  CETA  and  Vietnam  FTA, steps  were taken to address the lack of independence in ISDS. ISDS adjudicators under the CETA will be members of a roster with a reasonable degree of security of tenure. There   will also be more public   accountability   in   their   initial appointment, albeit with a potentially driving role in appointment decisions given   to trade   officials   rather   than   higher-level   publicly-accountable decision-makers,  and  adjudicators  will  be  assigned  to  cases  through  an objective process of rotation. Furthermore, adjudicators will not be permitted to work on the side as counsel in other ISDS cases although, remarkably, they are  not  prohibited  from  working  on  the  side  as  ISDS  arbitrators, thus apparently  permitting  a  party  to  an  ISDS  dispute  to  appoint  a  CETA  ISDS roster  member  as  an  arbitrator  in  an  ISDS  dispute  under  another  treaty  and to pay him or her directly and lucratively in that other context. This aspect of  the  revised  CETA –along  with  its  language  on  the  required  or  preferred expertise  of  ISDS  adjudicators  and  the potentially dominant  role  of  trade officials in appointments to the roster – suggests that a way may have been cleared  for  the  same  small  group  of  individuals  who  have  dominated  ISDS decision-making  so  far,  and  leaned  heavily  toward  expansive/pro-claimant investor resolutions of contested legal issues under investment treaties – to populate the CETA ISDS roster.

In Conclusion on ICS / ISDS:

“Domestic  investors  and  citizens  and  other   foreign  nationals   are disadvantaged in ISDS, relative to foreign investors. They face the usual risks of democracy, regulation, and courts in the usual ways: by taking part in the democratic  process,  by  lobbying  or  protesting,  by  buying  insurance,  by bargaining   for   strong   dispute   settlement   clauses   in   contracts   with government,  or  by  going  to  court.  Foreign  investors  can  still  do  all  these things too,  but  with  ISDS  they  have  the  added  weapon  of  an  exceptionally-powerful  right  to  sue  countries at  the  international  level.  Any  proposal  to grant  special  privileges,  backed  by  public  funds,  to  a group  of  economic actors – here, typically the  largest  and  wealthiest  in  the  world – calls at least for  a compelling justification based on clear  evidence of public benefit. The  absence  of  this  justification  and  evidence  has  been  a  key  omission  in European Union’s current pursuit of a greatly expanded role for ISDS.”

Reference: VanHarten, G. (2016) ‘The European Union’s Emerging  Approach  to  ISDS:  a  Review  of  the Canada-Europe  CETA,  Europe-Singapore  FTA,  and  European-Vietnam FTA’, in University Of Bologna Law Review, Vol. 1, ISSN2531-6133, DOI 10.6092/issn.2531-6133/6318. Available here: https://bolognalawreview.unibo.it/article/view/6318/6095